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We find that about 40% of a cohort of young Canadian men has been employed with an 
employer for whom their father also worked; and six to nine percent have the same employer 
in adulthood. The intergenerational transmission of employers is positively related to paternal 
earnings, particularly at the very top of the earnings distribution, and to the presence of self-
employment income and the number of employers with which the father has had direct 
contact. It has an important influence in determining nonlinear patterns in the intergenera-
tional elasticity of earnings. 
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The nature and extent of the relationship between the adult success of children and their 
family background is of longstanding interest in the social sciences and public policy. In 
large part this reflects the idea that the strength of the tie between parent and child 
outcomes is an interesting characterization of a society, revealing the degree to which 
inequality is transmitted across the generations and in a broad sense speaking to the 
notion of equality of opportunity. This interest motivates a literature in labour economics 
addressing the intergenerational relationship between parent and child earnings. The 
focus in this research, which is surveyed by Björklund and Jäntti (2009), Corak (2006) 
and Solon (2002, 1999), is on the accurate estimation of the intergenerational earnings 
elasticity in the context of a linear regression to the mean model. But as Roemer (2004) 
points out, on its own an intergenerational tie in the earnings of parents and children 
reveals little about the degree of equality of opportunity because it tells us little about the 
circumstances governing the types of advantages and investments passed on across the 
generations. On the one hand, it is often suggested that the explanation for these patterns 
involves the role of the family and public investments in promoting early childhood 
development. At the other extreme, it could well be that children resemble their parents 
because of nepotism in the hiring process determining access to good jobs. These are 
examples of the types of circumstances that are necessary to appreciate if we are to 
understand the significance of any given degree of intergenerational relationship in  
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earnings. Public policy directed to the early years will not be as effective in promoting 
equality of opportunity if the ultimate access to jobs is also determined by informal 
networks or nepotism during the teen or young adult years. 
We address this concern by using a large administrative data base on a cohort of 
young Canadian men to advance an argument that proceeds in three steps. First, we offer 
descriptive information on the degree to which employers are transmitted across the 
generations using two indicators addressing alternative perspectives on this process: the 
facilitation of job search through informational networks, and firm-specific investments 
made by parents in their children. We find that by their early 30s about four-in-ten sons 
have worked at least once for an employer who also employed their fathers. This is 
consistent with a long-established empirical literature showing that information from 
family and friends is the most common method of finding a job. In our data a significant 
fraction of this is associated with the first jobs that young people find during their teens 
and early twenties. However, we also document the fact that about six to nine percent of 
the individuals in our sample hold their main job as adults with the same main employer 
their fathers had some 15 to 20 years earlier. To the best of our knowledge this is the first 
economy-wide documentation of the intergenerational transmission of these types of 
employers. It offers general evidence on patterns that have been documented for specific 
sectors or occupations such as agriculture, law, and medicine. If there is merit to a firm-
specific human capital explanation of these patterns then it is appropriate for somewhere 
between one-in-twenty to one-in-ten young men. 
The second step in our argument is to more carefully address the determinants of 
these underlying patterns. By constructing a series of counterfactuals we show that these  
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proportions are much higher than would be expected from a simple random allocation of 
sons across firms. We also show that they are consistent with the role of informational 
networks and firm specific attributes passed on between father and son—as measured by 
the number of employers with which the father has had contact—as well as with 
influence over the hiring process, as indicated by a strong relationship with paternal 
income and self-employment. The intergenerational transmission of employers is higher 
among sons whose fathers have higher earnings, but particularly among the top five 
percent and strikingly so among the top one percent of the earnings distribution. Almost 
70% of the sons of top percentile fathers have at some point worked for a firm that also 
employed their fathers. 
Finally, our analysis relates the intergenerational transmission of employers to the 
intergenerational transmission of earnings. We find that the inheritance of employers 
raises the average intergenerational earnings elasticity, but not by a large degree. The 
influence is stronger when we examine non-linearities in the intergenerational elasticity. 
The intergenerational transmission of employers varies across the paternal earnings 
distribution, and is strongly associated with non-linear patterns in the intergenerational 
elasticity of earnings which also rises sharply at the top of the paternal earnings 
distribution. This calls for a more detailed analysis of the way in which the transmission 
of employers influences intergenerational earnings dynamics, and in general suggests that 
in future research the inheritance of employers form part of the study of intergenerational 
earnings mobility.  
 
2. Previous literature and measures of the intergenerational transmission of employers  
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The intergenerational transmission of employers is, in the first instance, often thought to 
depend on the extent to which parents directly control the chances their children will 
receive a job offer, changing the rate of job offers from particular employers and raising 
the possibility of nepotism. This perspective suggests that  the intergenerational 
transmission of jobs is more likely when fathers are self-employed, as examined by Lentz 
and Laband (1990) and Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000). In a similar way, fathers with 
higher earnings, and therefore possibly in positions with more autonomy and influence in 
the workplace, may also increase the likelihood their employers will extend a job offer to 
their sons. This is directly explored in a literature on the succession of CEOs as in Pérez-
González (2006) for the United States, and Bennedsen et al (2007) for Denmark. The 
incidence of family based succession—those in which the new CEO is related by blood 
or marriage to the departing CEO, the founder, or a large shareholder—is high in these 
data, representing more than one-third of the slightly over 300 successions among 
publicly traded companies in the US data used by Pérez-González (2006). 
While the intergenerational transmission of employers may very well be 
important for the children of the self-employed or very rich, it is likely to be more 
broadly based across the income and earnings distribution than this literature might 
suggest. It is well established that families and friends are important in the job search 
process. Granovetter (1995) is an often cited source documenting this in a small scale 
survey for a particular labour market, and Holzer (1988) explicitly models the choice of 
search methods underscoring the fact that family and friends represent a relatively 
productive and low cost way of obtaining job offers. These patterns are well established 
in nationally representative surveys with Loury (2006) suggesting that up to 50% of jobs  
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in the United States are found through family, friends or acquaintances. Ioannides and 
Loury (2004) offer a detailed survey documenting this sort of networking. In Canada, 
Grenon (1999) reports that about one-quarter of successful job searches involve family or 
friends. Magruder (2010) also makes network effects the focus of his analysis of 
similarities in the industry of employment for fathers and sons in South Africa. Kramarz 
and Skans (2007) are even more specific concerning the nature of the contacts, pointing 
out that there is a high tendency for young adults in Sweden to find their first job in the 
same plant that employs their parent. 
At the same time, there is also a literature on the intergenerational transmission of 
employers and occupations motivated less by job search theory than by models of firm or 
sector specific human capital investments that parents make in their children. The focus 
in this literature is on certain sectors, particularly the farming sector, where the 
development of very specific skills and knowledge among children plausibly implies that 
they will be more productive by inheriting the family farm than by working on other 
farms or in other sectors. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) develop this theory and offer 
evidence on developing countries, while Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001), Laband and Lentz 
(1983), and McNally (2003) study the agricultural sector in rich countries. This model 
has also been applied to the tendency of the children of doctors, lawyers, and the self-
employed to be employed in the same occupations as their fathers (Laband and Lentz 
1992, Lentz and Laband 1990, 1989). The interpretation of this process, however, is still 
open, with Polacheck (1986) not excluding the role of nepotism. But informative as this  
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literature is, it remains addressed to specific sectors and professions and has not been 
empirically examined at an economy-wide level.
1 
The job search and firm specific human capital literatures lead us to define two 
complementary definitions of what it means to be employed by the same firm as one’s 
parent. The first is a broad measure indicating whether an adult currently works, or 
worked at any point in the past, with the same employer who had also at some point 
employed his father.
 We present this measure to reflect the influence of parental networks 
on the child’s job search.
2 The second definition is more specific, referring to whether the 
individual’s main employer in adulthood is the same as the main employer the parent had 
during the child’s teen years. It is intended to reflect outcomes from firm-specific human 
capital investments made early in a child’s life that may improve the job offer distribution 
more in certain firms or sectors associated with the father’s place of work than in others. 
This requires a longer-term focus, and for this reason we examine the intergenerational 
transmission of the main employer the father had during the son’s teen years and the 
main employer of the son in adulthood. 
 
3. Nature of the data  
                                                 
1 There is also a long literature in sociology dealing with the intergenerational transmission of occupations 
and its relationship to social class with some of the chapters in Morgan, Fields and Gursky (2006) offering 
recent examples. Jonsson et al (2009) encompass the various strands in this literature, which rarely refers to 
the transmission of employers. Their analysis of four countries does make reference to Japan as a case in 
which the transmission of occupations across the generations is mediated by the transmission of employers. 
2 There will be an understatement built into this for a number of reasons. First, fathers may have direct 
knowledge of firms, their locations, hiring practices, and the chances their sons may obtain an offer that 
does not depend upon having been employed with them. Second, the network upon which the son may rely 
extends beyond his father to other relatives including potentially those of his father-in-law. Finally, the son 
might never have been employed at any of the firms that ever employed his father even though the network 
exists and he may have had the opportunity. On the other hand, this life-cycle measure of same-firm 
employment may overstate the breadth of the father’s network in the sense that the son could have found 
the job without relying upon the father.  
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We use a large administrative data set for a cohort of young Canadians. Our analysis is 
based upon the Intergenerational Income Data (IID) we developed at Statistics Canada 
from administrative information on individual income tax returns that have been grouped 
into families. Canadians file their income tax returns (officially referred to as T1 Forms) 
on an individual basis, and Statistics Canada has grouped these into families using a 
variety of matching strategies that are described in Harris and Lucaciu (1994). The 
resulting T1 Family File is the basic building block for the creation of the IID, an inter-
generationally linked set of T1 Forms for a series of cohorts of young men and women, 
and their mothers and fathers. This represents not quite four million individuals and their 
parents, and in particular 1.9 million men who are the starting point for our research. 
These individuals are linked to their fathers—not necessarily their biological fathers—if 
they filed an income tax return between 1982 and 1986 while still living at home. This is 
required to ensure that a parent-child match is made, and also that the child has an 
observed Social Insurance Number (SIN), a unique individual identifier that can then be 
used to link all subsequent T1 Forms which contain information on earnings. These T1 
Forms are available for all years between 1978 and 1996.
3 From this data we select the 
male cohort born in 1963, the oldest cohort of sons available to us (those who are 33 
years old at the end of the sample period). The use of the oldest cohort simplifies some of 
the derivations, but also improves the quality of the derived measure of permanent 
earnings by focusing on the oldest part of the child’s life cycle available to us. 
                                                 
3 The algorithm used to create the data leads to an under-representation of children from lower income 
backgrounds, and from the major metropolitan areas: Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver. Corak and Heisz 
(1999), Oreopoulos (2003), and Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens (2008) all explore the nature of this under-
reporting and find that it does not play a role in biasing their analytical results. We note that weights based 
upon Census data have been created to account for the under-reporting, and our analysis uses them 
throughout even though they make no difference to the results.  
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Table 1 presents basic descriptive information. To remain in the sample the father 
must have positive earnings in each of the five years the son was 15 to 19 years old, and 
must have been born between 1908 and 1952 inclusive. Sons must have positive earnings 
in each of three years, 1994 to 1996, and the earnings of both sons and fathers must be 
above the bottom percentile thereby avoiding some suspected measurement errors in the 
data. The sample size is about 71,000 observations, representing 84,000 individuals when 
appropriately weighted.
4 Fathers are on average in their mid forties when their earnings 
are calculated. 
Versions of these data have been used by Blanden (2005), Corak (2001), Corak, 
Gustafsson, and Österberg (2004), Corak and Heisz (1999), Grawe (2006, 2004), and 
Oreopoulos (2003) to study a host of issues dealing with intergenerational mobility. Our 
use of the data is closest to that of Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens (2008) who represent 
the only other application that uses information on the specific firms employing parents. 
The fathers and sons are employed at 24,000 to 32,000 distinct employers. The 
identification of these employers is developed from a longitudinally consistent catalogue 
of all enterprises in the country, and linked to individuals through the earnings remittance 
forms issued to employees (the T4) and used to support their income tax returns. This 
database of firms is referred to as the LEAP.
5 Each T4 has a payroll deduction account 
                                                 
4 By imposing these restrictions we are attempting to minimize the role of measurement error in earnings, 
as stressed in the literature on intergenerational earnings mobility (Solon 1992, 1989) Our selection rules 
correspond to Corak and Heisz (1999) who suggest that averaging over five years is long enough to 
minimize the rule of transitory earnings fluctuations in these Canadian data. This restriction has the greatest 
impact in determining the analytical sample. In the analysis that follows we check the robustness of our 
results by also using a sample in which the father is required to have only one year of positive earnings. 
5 The acronym refers to Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program. See Statistics Canada (1992, 1988) 
for a description of its construction and use. The use of this file is important because it accounts for 
changes in enterprise identifiers through mergers, and because it aggregates all plants to the enterprise 
level.  
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number unique to a firm, and the LEAP serves to aggregate the possibly many account 
numbers per firm into a single longitudinally consistent identifier. For each individual 
(fathers and sons) who are part of our intergenerational data, and for each year from 1978 
to 1996 we obtain unique firm identifiers on up to four employers.
6 Very few individuals 
ever have more than four different employers in any given year. Using the individual’s 
earnings from each employer we designate for a given year the firm accounting for the 
majority of total earnings as the “main” employer in that year, or sometimes over a five 
year horizon according to our analytical needs.
7 
On the basis of this information a son is defined to have the same employer as his 
father, during any given year from the age of 16 onward, if this employer at any point 
also employed the father in the past, as far back as the son’s 15
th year. In order to create 
this variable we define a vector of time-varying same-employer indicators that are set 
equal to one in year t if any of the son’s employers in year t were the same as any of the 
father’s employers over the period 1978 to t-1 inclusive. This definition of the 
intergenerational transmission of employers involves up to four different employers per 
year for both sons and fathers. At age 33 it can be used to determine the life-time 
incidence of the intergenerational transmission of employers, showing whether the son at 
any point since the age of 16 had the same employer as his father. 
                                                 
6 It is important to note that the LEAP is simply a catalogue of firms. In particular, we do not have 
information on all employees of all employers in the country, but rather are able to attach a firm identifier 
to the individuals—parents and children—who make up the intergenerational income data set. As such, for 
example, we are not able to determine the father’s position in the income hierarchy of the firm. 
7 For example, the father’s top four employers over the period the son was 15 to 19 years of age account for 
96% of all earnings. The main employer represents 85.5% of total paternal earnings; the second employer 
accounts for a further 7.8%; the third for 1.9% and the fourth for only 0.6%.  In the case of sons virtually 
all earnings are accounted for by the top four employers.  
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We also define what we refer to as the “main” employer of both the father and the 
son to calculate an indicator of our second definition of the intergenerational 
transmission. The main employer of the father is defined to be the employer representing 
the majority of earnings during the years the son was 15 to 19 years age. For the sons, the 
main employer is considered to be the employer representing the majority of earnings at 
the age of 33. The intergenerational transmission of main employers is intended to 
indicate the extent to which parents make firm specific human capital investments in their 
children that imply an influence over employers defining the child’s career. 
The LEAP offers an accurate representation of the private sector but our analysis 
of the intergenerational transfer of employers is limited by the fact that it does not 
distinguish separate employers in the public sector.
8 For anything finer than a two digit 
industry analysis this will overstate the degree to which employers or industries are 
passed across the generations. We therefore produce a set of results for two separate 
definitions of whether there is a match of employers between fathers and sons: one in 
which employment in the public service for both the father and son is considered to 
represent same firm employment, and one in which it is not. In fact, the findings do not 
vary significantly in kind, though there are differences in some of the descriptive results, 
with the former definition leading to a higher incidence of intergenerational transmission 
of employers. In what follows, we report results based upon the latter definition, observed 
                                                 
8 This refers to the federal and provincial public services but not to municipal governments. The proportion 
of sons working in the public sector in any given year is between 6 and 8 percent at ages 18 and older, and 
between 0.8 and 3% at ages 15 to 17.   
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matches in the public sector are coded as not being matches. As a result the analysis 
offers conservative estimates of the degree of intergenerational job contacts.
9 
 
4. The incidence of intergenerational transmission of employers 
By 33 years of age, just over 40% of sons are employed, or have been employed, at an 
employer that had at one time also employed their fathers. This result is presented in 
Figure 1, illustrating the proportion of sons who at any given age ever worked for an 
employer that at some point also employed their fathers. This is a cumulative variable 
that can only increase with time. 
The actual rate of increase in the incidence of same firm employment slows 
significantly after about age 25, and is relatively flat after age 27. This could reflect a 
particular life cycle pattern. The intergenerational transmission of employers is highest in 
the early stages of the life cycle as individuals are working while at school, or making the 
transition from formal schooling to work. It increases from less than 10% to 30% during 
the teen years, and then rising more slowly to 40% during the 20s. This may reflect the 
possibility that parental referrals are most important in obtaining a first and possibly part-
time or part-year job. However, in part it could also be the result of a mechanical effect 
arising from the fact that we only begin to observe the father and his employers when the 
child is 15 years of age. When the child is young we have a short history of employers to 
relate to his outcomes, which increases with each passing year. The fact that the change 
                                                 
9 Excluding all public servants from the dataset would be inappropriate for at least two reasons. First, we 
want to preserve those cases when either the son or the father but not both are employed by the 
federal/provincial government. These observations are “true” zeros for the same firm indicator. Second, 
since we consider up to four employers in each year, it would be very difficult to establish a consistent 
exclusion rule across time for individuals changing employers.  
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in the incidence of same firm employment flattens out by the late 20s suggest that this 
effect has worked itself out over the course of our observation period, but also that our 
final estimate must, once again, be consider an understatement. 
The intergenerational transmission of main employer in adulthood is much lower 
than this “life-time” incidence. Just under six percent (5.6%) of sons at the age of 33 have 
the same main employer their fathers had some 15 to 20 years earlier when the sons were 
teenagers.  
Both of these statistics are relatively robust to our sample selection rules. As 
noted, the most important selection rule underlying the analytical sample concerns the 
requirement that fathers have positive earnings in each of five consecutive years during 
their sons’ teen years. The selection rules also require that sons have positive earnings in 
each of three years during adulthood. These rules may lead to estimates of the 
intergenerational transmission of employers that are not representative of the population 
of young men, reflecting instead the subset of those from families with fathers having 
stable labour force attachment, and in the extreme being continuously employed. 
Accordingly we chose a much less stringent selection rule by requiring fathers and sons 
to have positive earnings only once over the same five and three year periods. This 
selection rule only requires fathers and sons to have had as few as one employer, and 
leads to a sample size of 109,158 rather than roughly 71,000. This more inclusive sample 
leads to lower, but not appreciatively lower, estimates of the proportion of sons with the 
same employer as their father: 38.4% at age 33 have at some point since the age of 16 
worked for an employer that also employed their father and 4.3% had as their main 
employer in adulthood the same main employer their father had 15 years earlier.   
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At the same time there may also be a sense in which our estimates understate the 
truth. We have included all sons in the calculation regardless of whether or not the 
father’s employer continues to exist. In some cases the employer goes bankrupt and the 
intergenerational transmission of employers is therefore not possible. However, more 
generally it is not just the death of a firm that will indicate the prospects of the son’s 
employment, but also the firm’s hiring policy. If the firm decides to shrink in size 
through attrition it may choose not to hire younger people at all. Incorporating these firms 
into the definition of “firm death” also helps to put a distinct upper bound to our 
estimates. To capture this, we define a 0-1 indicator if there are 30 to 33 year olds in 1996 
employed by the firm. If there are none or if the firm no longer exists, then the variable 
“Firm Death” takes a value of 1, otherwise zero. For the sake of simplicity we chose only 
the father’s main firm when the son was 15 to 19 years of age to define this variable. Our 
calculations indicate that in 40.5% of cases the fathers’ main employers were not in a 
position by the end of the period to hire the sons. By including these father-son pairs in 
the calculation it could be argued that we are understating the extent of the 
intergenerational transmission of employers. When we base our calculations conditional 
on the firm death variable not equaling one, the fraction of sons who have the same main 
employer as their father rises from 5.6% to 9.82%. Conditional on the firm “surviving”, 
the incidence of intergenerational transmission of employers is at the very most 1.75 
times higher. 
Finally, we note that the patterns in the intergenerational transmission of 
employers are related to paternal earnings. Higher paternal earnings are associated with a 
higher likelihood of intergenerational transmission of employers, and more specifically  
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with a distinctly nonlinear pattern. Figure 2 illustrates the underlying proportions with 
same-firm employment across the percentiles of the parental earnings distribution. 
Overall, the life-time incidence of same firm employment is 41% in these data, as given 
by the last observation in Figure 1. However, at percentiles below the 70
th, the incidence 
of same firm employment is above 45% only once, hovering for the most part below 40% 
though higher at the 15
th and lower percentiles. At or above the 85
th percentile, it is above 
45%  eight times, and always above the average. The proportion of sons employed at 
some point with the same firm that at some point also employed their fathers rises sharply 
after the 95
th reaching 55% at the second highest percentile and almost 70% among the 
children of fathers in the top percentile.
10 
Similar patterns govern the narrower definition of same firm employment: main 
employer at age 33 matching the father’s main employer when the son was 15 to 19 years 
of age. In this case the overall incidence of same firm employment is 5.6%, and there is a 
clear positive tendency in this percentage across the father’s earnings distribution starting 
at two to four percent at the bottom decile, and rising to six to eight percent at the ninth 
decile. Above the 95
th percentile this proportion also increases significantly, and 
particularly in the top percentile where 15% of sons have the same main employer their 
father had some 15 to 20 years earlier.
11  
 
5. An assessment based on counterfactual populations 
                                                 
10 The standard error for these proportions is for the most part about 2%, and about 1.7% at the very top of 
the distribution. As table 1 illustrates, the earnings cut-offs for the top 5% and top 1% of fathers are just 
under $80,000 and just over $125,000 respectively. 
11 See Corak and Piraino (2009) for more details.  
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The significance of these descriptive results depends upon the underlying reasons as to 
how employers are transmitted across generations. The labour market may be segmented, 
particularly between rural and urban areas, in a way that sons are likely to work for the 
same employer as their fathers by virtue of a lack of diversity in employment 
possibilities. In the extreme, imagine a labour market consisting of only single industry or 
single employer towns with no labour mobility between them. In this case, it is very 
likely that sons will at some point have worked with the same employer as their fathers. 
This may still have something to do with the mechanisms the theoretical literature 
focuses on: nepotism, contacts, and firm specific skills could in this context continue to 
be used to rank and allocate job applicants. But to some extent, it could also reflect the 
fact that even if sons were randomly allocated to firms, some considerable fraction would 
find a job with an employer who also employed their fathers. 
Accordingly, we create a number of counterfactual populations in which sons are 
allocated to employers randomly within different geographic limits, different industries, 
and within the same earnings quartile. The latter is meant to proxy for skill differences 
between sons, our data not having a measure of education or other formal human capital 
investments. As such this is not entirely distinct from the influence of parental 
background, but we maintain this assumption for the sake of giving the counterfactual the 
maximum possible explanatory power. We derive the proportion that have the same 
employer as their father for as detailed cells the sample size can reasonably support. The 
idea is that these statistics will help bound the degree to which the intergenerational 
transmission of employers reflects something more than just a lack of diversity in 
employment possibilities.  
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More specifically, we draw five hundred replications of a sample based upon 
random allocation of firms across sons in a way that preserves the same number of sons 
in each firm, and the overall number of individuals and firms as in the actual data. The 
assignment is done without replication, so that the final distribution reflects the same 
overall employment levels by firm as the actual sample of sons.  To make the exercise 
manageable we focus solely on the main employer in adulthood. The results are reported 
in Table 2 using all firms, and only the firms not dying in the sense defined previously. 
The table reports the mean incidence and its standard deviation across the 500 
replications for each of eleven different scenarios. 
The first counterfactual, referred to as “Full random assignment,” offers an 
estimate of the incidence of same main firm employment across generations if sons were 
randomly assigned to any enterprise in the country employing their generation. The 
second row refers to a random allocation across all firms within the same two-digit 
industry, while the third row reports similar results within the same earnings quartile, and 
the fourth within a combination of industry and earnings. In no cases would the resulting 
distribution of sons across employers imply much more than about one-third of one 
percent of sons working with the same employer as their father. 
The remaining rows of the table add a geographic dimension. The results in row 5 
refer to a reallocation of sons in the same first digit of the postal code, which divide the 
country into 18 distinct regions.
12 A rural versus urban dimension is offered in row 6, and 
                                                 
12 The first digit of the postal code is a letter, which uniquely identifies a province with the exception of the 
larger provinces. Ontario is divided into five sub-regions, and Quebec into three. As such there are a total 
of 18 indicators for province/region, which in addition to the ten provinces includes two indicators for the 
three northern territories. The second digit of the postal code is a number that can be used to identify if the 
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the finest regional break down, using the first two digits of the postal code and hence 135 
distinct regions, is offered in row 7. A random allocation of sons across firms within 
these different geographic boundaries also leads to a maximum of one-third of one 
percent being employed at the same employer as their father, substantially below the 5.6 
percent figure observed in the data. 
In the last four rows of Table 2 the reference is to cross-classifications of region, 
industry, and earnings. These are the finest cells we are able to define with the sample 
size available to us, and the highest estimate of the intergenerational transmission of 
employers is 1.5% when the randomization occurs across two-digit industries within the 
smallest geographic area (row 10). The patterns are the same in the second set of results 
offered for the firms not dying, with highest estimate of the proportion of same employer 
across the generations being less than one-third of the figure actually observed in the 
data. 
In other words, our simulations show that even if we were to randomly deploy the 
sons in our sample to employers in the same industry, operating in the same geographical 
region, and requiring a similar set of skills—as roughly proxied by the regional within-
industry earnings quartile—the resulting intergenerational transmission of employers 
would still be significantly lower than  actually observed. There is something more than a 
preference for a specific region, industry sector, and wage range that leads sons to be 
employed in exactly the same firm that once employed their fathers. 
 
6. Linear probability models of the role of family background 
                                                                                                                                                 
postal code refers to an urban or rural area.  See www.canadapost.ca/personal/tools/pg/manual/PGaddress-
e.asp for details.  
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These results suggest that other aspects of family background may influence the 
inheritance of employers, and we explore these correlates in more detail using a series of 
linear probability models. The dependent variables are 0-1 indicators of the two 
measures, reflecting the overall averages of 41% and 5.6%. We consider two sets of 
variables: the individual characteristics of the father; the characteristics of the firm. The 
definition of these variables and associated descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. 
  The natural logarithm of father’s earnings and earnings squared are included to 
capture the patterns illustrated in Figures 2, while the father’s age and age squared are 
used to control for possible life-cycle differences. The number of employers the father 
had over a ten year period is intended to indicate both the extent of the network the son 
may draw upon, and also the father’s reputation.
13 It also refers to the scope for the 
transmission of firm-specific attributes: the greater the number of previous employers, the 
less likely the father has any firm specific capital to pass on to his son. As such we expect 
this variable to have a positive influence in the model of ever same employer—reflecting 
the role of networks—but a negative influence in the model of same main employer.
14 On 
                                                 
13 If the father has worked with many firms, then this may imply a higher likelihood the son will be 
employed at a firm that also employed the father: there is simply a wider set of contacts upon which the son 
may draw. But this presupposes that the father is seen by the employer as offering reliable information 
about a high-quality match. For example, Montgomery (1991) offers a formal model of a job referral 
process where the father’s contacts raise the son’s job offer arrival rate if the father has a positive 
reputation, and is considered by the employer to be a reliable source of information about the unobserved 
characteristics of the son. In Montgomery’s model firms do not make job offers to those referred by low-
ability employees. Further, low-ability workers are of lower productivity and will have shorter job tenures. 
This implies that fathers who are low-ability will experience more job turnover, and as such the number of 
employers we observe the father to have over an extended period may reflect a poor reputation from which 
the son cannot benefit. Consequently, we can expect a non-linear relationship between the number of 
paternal employers and the likelihood that they will be transmitted inter-generationally: first increasing as 
the number of parental employers increases, and then decreasing as the pool of fathers with a higher 
number of employers becomes increasingly dominated with lower-quality workers. 
14 Magruder (2010) uses a roughly similar approach to distinguish these two models. His analysis is looks 
at the intergenerational correlation of industries, and uses fathers how have been industry-switchers to 
examine the role of their past industries on the industry of employment for the son.  
  19 
average, fathers have 2.8 employers over a ten year period, but the standard deviation at 
2.9 is actually a bit higher than the mean.  
The model also includes a series of 0-1 indicator variables for the presence of 
non-zero self-employment income over a five year period, be it from farming, fishing, 
professional, or from other more common sources of self-employment associated with 
unincorporated businesses. These variables offer an indication of possibly a heightened 
degree of control over the firm’s hiring practices. It should be noted that for the time 
being our analysis is based upon paternal earnings, not total income. The value of self-
employment income could be positive or negative, our concern not being with the amount 
but with the possibility that the father may have direct control over hiring practices. 
About 11% of fathers are in this situation. Strictly speaking, however, we cannot identify 
if this income is from the same firm generating the father’s earnings. This indicator of the 
presence of self-employment income is also interacted with the natural logarithm of 
father’s earnings and earnings squared to permit the influence to vary across the earnings 
distribution. 
These variables—father’s earnings, number of employers, and self-employment 
income—are of most interest to us, reflecting the capacity to promote the labour market 
outcomes of the son through job search, specific human capital investments, or 
nepotism.
15  
                                                 
15 In order to hold constant the diversity of the employment prospects of the son we include a series of 
region indicators of where the father lived when the son was still living with him. Following the analysis in 
the previous section these indicators are derived from the first two digits of the postal code, and offer 
information on rural and urban areas as well as provincial and sub-provincial regions. Almost three-
quarters of the observations are to be found in urban areas. We also use the indicator of firm death. The 
firm size at the onset of the period is also controlled for using a series of indicator variables. This refers to 
the total number of fathers in our data employed by the firms, and not therefore to the total number of 
employees. Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens (2008) also use this variable, and note that it represents not 
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The results for a series of specifications are presented in Tables 4 and 5 for the 
two definitions of the dependent variable. A quadratic relationship between paternal 
earnings and the chances of same-firm employment is robust to the specification, and the 
particular parameter values suggest the relationship is parabolic being highest for sons 
from highest earning fathers. The relationship between the number of employers the 
father had and chances of same-firm employment is an inverted U-shape in Table 4, 
suggesting that increases in the number of employers the father had to a maximum of 
between 7 and 8 over a ten year period increases the likelihood the son will be employed 
at one of them. The pattern is in fact the opposite when the focus is on the same main 
firm dependent variable in Table 5, with more paternal employers lowering the likelihood 
that the child will be employed in the same main firm of the father. Both of these patterns 
are in accord with our priors, a larger number of employers indicating in the former case 
a wider set of contacts, but in the latter that the father may not have had a strong foothold 
in any particular firm and hence less likely to pass on any firm-specific capital to the son. 
 Of the four indicators of the type of income, only the indicator for self 
employment income is consistently statistically significant, having the expected positive 
sign. The last specification in Table 4 indicates that this influence plays somewhat 
through the amount of the father’s earnings. These estimates imply that at the sample 
mean of paternal earnings, having a father with some self-employment income raises the 
                                                                                                                                                 
quite one-tenth of actual firm size as indicated by the full LEAP database. About 50% of fathers are in the 
smallest category, with the next highest proportions in the larger categories: 14% and 12% in firms of more 
than 100 and more than 500 of these workers. Finally, we include a number of characteristics of the two 
digit industry to which the father’s main firm is classified: the employment growth over the period, the 
average years of education of all employees, an interaction of this latter variable with the father’s income, 
and indicator variables for the two-digit SIC. These capture the overall chances of employment, the 
educational requirements—the ability to meet them potentially varying with the father’s earnings—and any 
industry specific differences in hiring practices such as the rate of unionization.  
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probability of ever having worked in the same firm by 5.9%, slightly higher than the 
4.8% estimate in the previous column based upon no interaction effects. There is no such 
impact when the focus is on the main employer, the interactions not being statistically 
significant in column (6) of Table 5. Other forms of self-employment associated with 
agriculture and fishing are not statistically significant, nor is the indicator for the presence 
of professional income.
16 
While these results include controls for detailed region and industry indicators, we 
check their robustness by offering estimates separately for urban and rural region using 
the specification in column (6) of these tables. Tables 6 and 7 present selected findings 
across geographic regions for our two definitions. The tables report the estimated 
coefficients for the variables we are most interested—father’s earnings, father’s number 
of employers, and the presence of self-employment income—and indicate that they do 
not change across the two geographic areas, with one possible exception. In Table 6 the 
major difference between the two subsamples is the finding that the number of employers 
the father had is stronger in magnitude in the rural sample. The higher rural coefficients 
may be interpreted as indicating that any given number of employers the father has 
represents a greater proportion of the total possible employers with which the son may be 
employed. But this does not seem to be the case in Table 7, where the focus is on the 
career employer as opposed to any employer. 
We also recognize that the estimates offered in Tables 4 and 5 are based entirely 
upon father’s earnings, though indicators for the presence of self-employment and other 
                                                 
16 The firm death variable is estimated to be negative, as is the indicator of urban residence. Finally, the use 
of the industry dummy variables seems to clarify the role of firm size, their inclusion indicating that sons 
are most likely to be hired in smaller than in larger firms.  
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types of income are included. As such earnings may not accurately represent the total 
financial resources available to the father. The last column of Tables 6 and 7 offers 
estimates based upon the father’s total market income, which includes self-employment 
income, as the regressor. This increases the magnitude and the statistical significance of 
the self-employment indicator and the associated interactions, particularly in Table 7 
where the focus is on the main same employer. The earnings-based analysis did not 
reveal a statistically significant impact of having a father reporting self-employment 
income on the chances that main firms were transmitted across generations. These results 
suggest that this is in fact the case for both definitions of generational employer 
transmission, but it should be noted that it remains much stronger in magnitude when 
determining the likelihood of the son getting a job as opposed to getting a career job. 
In summary, the most notable results in these tables are the robust positive 
relationship with respect to father’s self-employment income, the nonlinear positive 
relationship between parental earnings and the probability of same firm employment, and 
the contrasting patterns across the two tables with respect to the father’s number of 
employers. 
 
7. The relationship between employers and earnings across the generations 
The transmission of employers across the generations has implications for the 
generational transmission of earnings. The empirical analysis of intergenerational 
earnings mobility makes extensive use of a linear regression to the mean model: ln Yt = α 
+ β lnYt-1 + εt , where Y is a measure of permanent income, t indexes generations, and  
  23 
where β, the intergenerational earnings elasticity, is the parameter of interest.
17 There is a 
consensus on the value of β for Canada. Corak and Heisz (1999) estimate it to be about 
0.2 with the same data that is the basis of our paper, while Fortin and Lefebvre (1998) use 
survey data and instrumental variables methods and obtain a similar value.   
  Tables 8 and 9 present least squares estimates of the intergenerational elasticity, 
for the two alternative definitions of same firm employment using various versions of the 
following general specification: 
ln Yi,t =  α + β lnYi,t-1 + β1 lnYi,t-1 × SameFirmi + 
γ1SameFirmi  +  γ2SameIndustryi  +  γ3SameRegioni + εi,t  
The main concern is with the interaction term β1, which measures the influence of the 
intergenerational transmission of employers on the intergenerational earnings elasticity. 
We define the same industry and same region variables to be indicators of employment in 
the same two-digit industry, and residence in the same narrowly defined region (the first 
two digits of the postal code being the same). 
The results suggest that the overall average elasticity of earnings is 0.25.
18 The 
presence of the intergenerational transmission of employers has a slight tendency to 
increase the overall average elasticity, as indicated by the change in the estimate between 
                                                 
17 The theoretical motivation for this equation is Becker and Tomes (1986, 1979) and Loury (1981), but 
there is an extensive empirical literature informed in a significant degree by Solon (1992, 1989) and 
Zimmerman (1992) who highlight the challenges measurement errors and life cycle biases pose in correctly 
estimating the elasticity. Surveys of this empirical research include Björklund and Jäntti (2008), Corak 
(2006), and Solon (2002, 1999), with Böhlmark and Lindquist (2006), Grawe (2006), and Haider and Solon 
(2006) offering the most recent methodological developments. 
18 This is slightly higher than those reported in Corak and Heisz (1999) because we are using only the 
oldest cohort of the data available to them. When our estimations are based on all available cohorts the 
resulting estimate is 0.226.  
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columns (1) and columns (2) to (4) of these tables.
19 When the focus is on the son ever 
having been employed at the same firm as the father the overall elasticity falls from 0.25 
to about 0.20 for those not having the same employer, and rises to about 0.3 for those 
who do have the same employer. But this tendency is less notable in the case of same 
main employer being the same. Table 9 illustrates that the overall elasticity of 0.25 falls 
at most to 0.22 when controls for same industry and same region are included, and even 
less otherwise. While the degree of generational mobility is significantly lower for sons 
with the same main firm as fathers (the elasticity rising to about 0.4), this does not 
significantly change the overall measure of mobility. 
The notable feature in Corak and Heisz (1999), however, is that the large sample 
size permits estimation of non-linear patterns in the intergenerational elasticity. They find 
that the intergenerational elasticity rises over the lower half of the father’s earnings 
distribution peaking at about 0.3, falls over the upper half, and then rises sharply to 0.4 
and even higher at the very top of the distribution.
20 As such the linear model is not an 
accurate representation of the actual patterns in the elasticity across the father’s earnings 
distribution. 
The influence of the inheritance of employers is more important at some points in 
the father’s earnings distribution than others, and contributes to these non-linear patterns. 
                                                 
19 The influence of the intergenerational transmission of employers on the degree of generational earnings 
mobility in this regression to the mean model is examined in detail by Corak and Piraino (2009), who use 
estimates of this sort as a starting point, but argue that the appropriate estimation strategy is a switching 
regression with sample separation unknown or known imperfectly. 
20 Solon (1992) was not able to address variation in the intergenerational elasticity across the father’s 
earnings distribution conclusively with PSID data, but Bratsberg et al. (2007) document non-linear patterns 
for other countries, some of which have a similar average elasticity as Canada. The reasons for these 
patterns are the subject of discussion in the literature, with the possibility of credit constraints in the manner 
of Becker and Tomes (1986) representing the starting point for many analyses, and indeed for some of the 
conjectures in Corak and Heisz (1999). Grawe (2004) brings this interpretation into question, and Han and 
Mulligan (2001) explore the issue in detail.  
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Figures 3 and 4 show these distinct non-linear patterns according to whether the son 
worked at the same employer as his father or not.
21 The intergenerational earnings 
elasticity is much higher throughout the father’s earnings distribution for those sons ever 
having the same employer as their fathers. For example, in Figure 3 the intergenerational 
elasticity for this group is for the most part above 0.2, but for those not experiencing the 
intergenerational transmission of an employer it just exceeds this value at its maximum. 
Relatively speaking the elasticity is also much higher at the upper tail given that it tends 
to fall off throughout the upper half of the earnings distribution for sons not employed at 
the same firm as their fathers. This suggests that part of the preservation of earnings 
across the generations for sons of the top-earning fathers has to do with the 
intergenerational transmission of employers. In fact, the negative estimate when fathers 
have earnings more than one standard deviation above the mean for those not having the 
same employer as their fathers indicates an intergenerational reversal of earnings. 
All of this is particularly so in reference to the more narrow measure of same firm 
employment: when the son has the same main employer as an adult that his father had 15 
or so years earlier the intergenerational earnings elasticity ranges from 0.5 to 0.8 when 
earnings are more than two standard deviations from the mean. In addition, for the large 
part of the distribution in the lower half of the earnings distribution the value is also 
notably high and relatively constant at about 0.5. Most clearly, however, if there is a 
sharp spike in the intergenerational elasticity at the top of the earnings distribution for the 
                                                 
21 The results are based upon a nearest-neighbourhood estimator with locally-weighted least squares 
regressions, as described in Loader (1999) and as implemented in S-Plus. The weighting function is the 
tricubic, a cubic functional form is used for the regression, and the span is set at 0.7. These are the same 
specifications as Corak and Heisz (1999).   
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population as a whole, as observed in Corak and Heisz (1999), this exclusively reflects 
the elasticity for those working as adults for the same main employer as their father. 
 
8. Conclusion 
We document the intergenerational transmission of employers between fathers and sons 
with a large Canadian based administrative data set by deriving two complementary 
indicators. The first is related to the job search process and the role of parental networks, 
and speaks to the empirical findings in the job search literature that most jobs are found 
through families and friends. The second is related to the specific investments that 
parents may make in the human capital of their children in a way that increases 
productivity in particular firms. Both of these indicators will also be influenced by the 
capacity of parents to directly influence the recruitment process in particular firms, which 
we expect to be more important among higher earning parents.  
Our analysis does not exclude any of these models of the intergenerational 
transmission of employers. Rather we illustrate that each has a bearing on observed 
patterns, with each being more relevant at different points in the series of transitions 
young people make in obtaining their career jobs. We find that by the age of 33 
approximately 4 in 10 men have worked at some point with an employer who had also at 
some point employed their father. Much of this intergenerational transmission of 
employers occurs during the teen years, but as a lower bound about 6% (and as an upper 
bound 9%) of 33 year olds have as their main employer the same employer their fathers 
worked for some 15 to 20 years earlier. These percentages are higher than would be 
expected by a random allocation of sons to firms in specific industrial, regional, and sub- 
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regional labour markets, and reflect particular characteristics of their family background. 
The intergenerational transmission of employers is much more likely at the top of the 
earnings distribution. Close to 70% of sons of top percentile fathers had at some point the 
same employer as their fathers, and for 15% their main employer at the age of 33 was the 
same employer their father worked for during their teen years. 
Our results from a series of linear probability models are consistent with a set of 
hypotheses we draw from literature. First, the generational transmission of employers is 
higher when fathers have self-employment income, and higher for fathers with higher 
earnings and incomes. In particular, the probability that sons will be employed by the 
same employer as their father is distinctly non-linear, being much higher for the highest 
earning fathers. Second, self-employment also significantly tightens the relationship 
between parental earnings and intergenerational transmission of employers. These 
findings do not reject the hypothesis that the generational transmission of employers 
reflects some direct parental influence over the hiring process. Finally, the more 
employers the father has had, the more likely the son will be employed at one of them at 
some point in his life. But the more employers the father has had, that is the less likely he 
has any firm specific capital to pass on, the less likely the son will be employed at one of 
them as a career in adulthood. As such our findings are also in line with the predictions of 
both the job search model, and a model of firm-specific human capital: the first reflecting 
in large measure the jobs young people find during their teen years and in making the 
transition from school to work, the second their employers in adulthood. 
These patterns have consequences for the intergenerational transmission of 
earnings. We find that while the intergenerational transmission of employers slightly  
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raises the overall average intergenerational elasticity of earnings, it has a larger bearing 
on understanding non-linear patterns in this elasticity across the father’s earnings 
distribution. In particular, the elevated elasticities observed in the middle of the earnings 
distribution as well as in the upper tail of these Canadian data reflect the patterns of those 
who also inherit an employer from their father. 
The literature on the degree of generational earnings mobility is oftentimes linked 
to the growing research on early childhood development, the formation of values and 
preferences, and their impact on readiness to learn and pro-social behaviour that are all 
important antecedents to educational attainment and ultimately labour market success. 
Our research suggests that it is also important to understand the nature of labour markets 
and the way in which young adults interface with them during the transition to adulthood, 
and ultimately in final career choices. Parents may also be in a position to influence this 
process by offering contacts and knowledge of employment with particular employers, 
and in the extreme exercising direct control. This may be an important complement to the 
non-monetary investments early in life. The capacity of parents to play a role in a child’s 
transition to the labour market varies according to their place in the earnings distribution, 
and this may also be a part of the explanation for the degree to which children may have 
similar earnings as their parents, a possibility that future research with data from other 
countries should recognize. 
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Table 1 






























             
             
71,215  47.35  33  43,524  36,129  23,991  31,729 
  (6.14)  (0.00)  (27,085)  (22,953)     
             




th   25
th   50
th   75
th   95
th   99
th  
             
  15,231  29,794  39,671  51,973  79,910  126,195 
             
             
 
Note: The sample refers to father and son pairs in which the sons are born in 1963, and who are hence 33 years of age in 1996. 
Fathers’ earnings refer to the average over the five year average the son was 15 to 19 years of age, expressed in 1992 constant 
dollars. Sons’ earnings are averaged over the ages of 30 to 33. The number of unique employers refers only to the main employer, 
the employer that paid the largest proportion of total earnings during the above periods. Figures in parentheses are standard 
deviations.  
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Table 2 
Incidence of the intergenerational transmission of same main firm for different simulated 
populations in which sons are randomly assigned to employers 
 
     
All Firms 
 
Firms not dying 











         
Country wide incidence of same firm employment  5.586    9.394   
           
1.  Full random assignment  0.041  (0.008)  0.081  (0.013) 
           
2.  Within two-digit industries  0.287  (0.019)  0.544  (0.035) 
3.  Within earnings quartile  0.047  (0.008)  0.090  (0.015) 
4.  Within two-digit industries and earnings quartile  0.368  (0.020)  0.685  (0.036) 
           
5.  Within 1
st digit postal code  0.150  (0.016)  0.291  (0.027) 
6.  Within urban/rural areas  0.156  (0.015)  0.306  (0.025) 
7.  Within 2








           
8.  Within 1
st digit postal code and industry  0.884  (0.028)  1.620  (0.045) 
9.  Within 1
st digit postal code, industry, earnings 
quartile  1.040  (0.027)  1.887  (0.047) 
10.  Within 2
nd digit postal code and industry  1.455  (0.026)  2.738  (0.040) 
11.  Within 2
nd digit postal code and earnings quartile  0.375  (0.020)  0.716  (0.036) 
           
           
Note: See definitions in the text. The first row in each panel represents the actual proportion of sons 
observed to have as their main employer in adulthood being the same as their fathers. All other figures are 
the mean proportions of simulation results based upon 500 replications of a random allocation of employers 
across sons. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive information on variables used in modeling the incidence of intergenerational 
transmission of employers for a cohort of 33 year old men 
 
     








           
Dependent Variable           
  Ever Same Firm  0-1 indicator of whether the son had by the 
age of 33 employment in any given year 
since the age of 16 with a firm that 
employed his father in any previous year 
0.410   
  Same Main Firm  0-1 indicator of whether the employer 
accounting for the majority of the son’s 
earnings between at the age of 33 is the 
same as the employer accounting for the 
majority of the father’s earnings when the 
son was 15 to 19 years of age 
0.056   
           
Father’s Characteristics           
  ln earnings 
ln earnings
2 
Natural logarithm of 5 year average of 
father’s earnings when the son was 15 to 19 
years of age, and its value squared 
10.6  0.514 
             
  Number of employers 
Number of employers
2 
The number of different employers the 
father had over the ten year period 1978 to 
1988, and its value squared 
2.83  2.87 
             
  Farming income  Presence of non zero income from farming 
at least once over a five year period 
0.0573   
  Fishing income  Presence of non zero income from fishing at 
least once over a five year period 
0.00437   
  Professional income  Presence of non zero professional income at 
least once over a five year period 
0.0156   
  Self employment income  Presence of non zero income from other 
sources of self-employment over a five year 
period 
0.112   
             
  Age 
Age
2 
Average age during the years the son was 15 
to 19 years old, and its value squared 
47.3  6.13 
             
Firm and industry characteristics           
   
Province / Region 
A series of 18 indicator variables of the region of father’s residence 
derived from the first digit of the postal code. These are provinces 
with the exception of Ontario which is divided into 5 sub-provincial 
regions and Quebec which is divided into three. Metropolitan 
Toronto serves as the omitted category in the estimations. 




A 0-1 indicator of whether the father lived in 
an urban area as indicated by a non-zero 
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Firm Death 
An indicator of whether the father’s main 
employer when the son was 15 to 19 
employed at least one person 30 to 33 years 




             
  Firm Size 1 to 10 
Firm Size 11 to 20 
Firm Size 21 to 50  
Firm Size 51 to 100 
Firm Size 101 to 500 
Firm Size 501 and more 
Indicator variables of the total number of 
employees of the father’s main employer 
during the years the son was 15 to 19 years 
of age. The largest category serving as the 








             
   
Industry employment growth 
Difference between the natural logarithms of 
the total employment in the 2-digit industry 
of the fathers main employer in the1981 and 






   
Average years of schooling by 
two digit industry 
Average years of schooling of all employees 
in the 2 digit SIC 1980 industry of the 







   
Two digit industry indicators 
A series of 75 indicator variables for the 2-
digit SIC 1980  industry of the father’s main 
firm when the son was 15 to 19 years old 
   
             
Interactions           
  ln earnings × years industry average schooling         
  ln earnings × Self-employment income         
  ln earnings
2 × Self-employment income         
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Table 4 
Estimates of linear probability models for same firm employment by fathers and sons: 
ever employed at the same firm as father  
 













             
Father’s Characteristics             
  ln earnings  0.037  -1.13  -0.959  -0.648  -0.486  -0.731 
  ln earnings
2    0.0562  0.0484  0.0458  0.0431  0.0556 
               
  Number of employers      0.0189  0.0067  0.0076  0.0075 
  Number of employers
2      -0.00085  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0005 
  Farming income      0.01032  -0.0190  -0.0192  -0.0189 
  Fishing income      0.00511  0.0320  0.0350  0.0329 
  Professional income      -0.0829  -0.0055  -0.0146  -0.0145 
  Self employment income      0.0593  0.0461  0.0476  -3.247 
               
  Age  0.0119  0.0120  0.0125  0.0133  0.0146  0.0144 
  Age
2 / 10  -0.0018  -0.0019  -0.00184  -0.0018  -0.0020  -0.0019 
               
Firm and industry 
characteristics 
           
  Firm Death        -0.057  -0.066  -0.0654 
  Firm size 1 to 10                0.251  0.087  0.087 
  Firm size 11 to 20        0.171  -0.0017  -0.001 
  Firm size 21 to 50              0.183  0.0029  0.003 
  Firm size 51 to 100        0.166  -0.0078  -0.008 
  Firm size 101 to 500         0.101  -0.037  -0.0378 
  Industry employment growth      0.133  0.158  0.156 
  Average years of schooling by two digit industry    0.117  0.236  0.236 
  Urban          -0.065  -0.0611  -0.0609 
  Province / Region – number of indicators    19  19  19 
  Two digit industry indicators– number of indicators    75  75 
               
Interactions             
  ln earnings × years industry average schooling    -0.017  -0.0255  -0.0258 
  ln earnings × Self-employment 
income 
     
  0.682 
  ln earnings
2 × Self-employment 
income 
     
  -0.0349 
               
Constant  -0.125  5.97  4.91  2.57  1.10  2.30 
               
R
2  0.0080  0.0116  0.0160  0.0792  0.1017  0.1025 
               
               
Note: The dependent variable is defined to be a 0-1 indicator with the value of 1 indicating that the son was at employed at some point 
since the age of 16 with a firm that at some point in the past also employed his father. The analysis is based upon 70,997 33 year old 
men, and information on their fathers. Boldface indicates results with t-statistics above 1.96, the analysis being based upon sample 
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Table 5 
Estimates of linear probability models for same firm employment by fathers and sons: 
main firm at 33 years of age same as father  
 













             
Father’s Characteristics             
  ln earnings  0.0277  -0.193  -0.317  -0.250  -0.242  -0.270 
  ln earnings
2    0.0106  0.0159  0.0173  0.0175  0.0189 
               
  Number of employers      -0.0203  -0.0131  -0.0130  -0.0130 
  Number of employers
2      0.00081  0.00048  0.00046  0.00046 
               
  Farming income      0.0004  -0.0031  -0.0030  -0.0031 
  Fishing income      -0.0164  -0.0122  -0.0084  -0.0086 
  Professional income      -0.0276  -0.0057  -0.0053  -0.0054 
  Self employment income      0.0072  0.0052  0.0054  -0.5204 
               
  Age  0.00004  0.00001  -0.00012  0.00041  0.00045  0.00048 
  Age
2 / 10  -0.00008  -0.00009  -0.00015  -0.00017  -0.00018  -0.00018 
               
Firm and industry 
characteristics 
           
  Firm Death        -0.136  -0.143  -0.143 
  Firm size 1 to 10              0.0793  0.0320  0.0319 
  Firm size 11 to 19                0.0229  -0.0209  -0.0210 
  Firm size 21 to 50              0.0180  -0.0276  -0.0276 
  Firm size 51 to 100        0.0139  -0.0288  -0.0288 
  Firm size 101 to 500         0.0150  -0.0250  -0.0250 
               
  Industry employment growth      0.0718  0.0161  0.0161 
  Average years of schooling by two digit industry    0.0581  0.0838  0.0847 
  Urban          -0.0116  -0.0137  -0.0137 
  Province / Region – number of indicators    19  19  19 
  Two digit industry indicators – number of indicators    75  75 
               
Interactions             
  ln earnings × years industry average schooling    -0.0076  -0.0087  -0.0088 
  ln earnings × Self-employment 
income 
       
0.099 
  ln earnings
2 × Self-employment 
income 
         
-0.0047 
               
Constant  -0.216  0.932  1.71  1.10  0.90  1.03 
               
R
2  0.0046  0.0052  0.0204  0.0834  0.0958  0.0958 
               
               
Note: The dependent variable is defined to be a 0-1 indicator with the value of 1 indicating that the son’s main employer at age 33 is 
the same as the father’s main employer when the son was 15 to19 years of age. The analysis is based upon 70,997 men, and 
information on their fathers. Boldface indicates results with t-statistics above 1.96, the analysis being based upon sample weights and 
robust calculations of standard errors. 
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Table 6 
Alternative specifications of linear probability models for same firm employment by 
fathers and sons: ever employed at the same firm as father  
 
     
 
 



















             
Father’s Characteristics             
  ln earnings      -0.731  -0.705  -0.551  -0.694 
  ln earnings
2      0.0556  0.0570  0.0505  0.0575 
               
  Number of employers    0.0075  0.0136  0.0047  0.0103 
  Number of employers
2    -0.0005  -0.0007  -0.0003  -0.0005 
               
  Farming income      -0.0189  -0.0447  0.0299  -0.0181 
  Fishing income      0.0329  0.0324  -0.0058  0.0336 
  Professional income      -0.0145  -0.0681  -0.0096  -0.0399 
  Self employment income    -3.247  -3.555  -2.965  -5.023 
               
  ln earnings × Self-employment income  0.682  0.745  0.624  1.00 
  ln earnings
2 × Self-employment income  -0.0349  -0.038  -0.0320  -0.0493 
               
R
2        0.1025  0.1348  0.0941  0.1101 
Number of observations      70,997  15,817  55,180  70,980 
               
 
Note: The dependent variable is defined to be a 0-1 indicator with the value of 1 indicating that the son was employed at some point 
since the age of 16 with a firm that at some point in the past also employed his father. Rural subsample refers to those father-son 
observations with fathers having lived in rural areas, those with a second digit of the postal code equal to zero, and Urban subsample 
to those living in urban areas, with a second digit of the postal code not equal to zero. Boldface indicates results with t-statistics above 
1.96, the analysis being based upon sample weights and robust calculations of standard errors. The coefficient on the presence of self-
employment income in the rural subsample is statistically significant at the 10% level, with p-value of 0.052. The specification for the 
last column is based upon total parental market income in all cases, not earnings. All models include the remaining covariates reported 
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Table 7 
Alternative specifications of linear probability models for same firm employment by 
fathers and sons: main firm at 33 years of age same as father 
 
     
 
 



















             
Father’s Characteristics             
  ln earnings      -0.270  -0.306  -0.339  -0. 306 
  ln earnings
2      0.0189  0.0218  0.0229  0.0237 
               
  Number of employers    -0.0130  -0.0137  -0.0128  -0.0118 
  Number of employers
2    0.00046   0.0005  0.00045  0.00043 
               
  Farming income      -0.0031  -0.0061  0.0052  -0.00017 
  Fishing income      -0.00086  0.0012  -0.0257  -0.0048 
  Professional income      -0.0054  -0.0316  -0.0040  -0.0141 
  Self employment income    -0.5204  -0.911  -0.637  -1.796 
               
  ln earnings × Self-employment income  0.099  0.182  0.122  0.338 
  ln earnings
2 × Self-employment income  -0.0047  -0.009  -0.0057  -0.016 
               
R
2        0.0958  0.1356  0.0867  0.1018 
Number of observations      70,997  15,817  55,180  70,980 
               
 
Note: The dependent variable is defined to be a 0-1 indicator with the value of 1 indicating that the son’s main employer at 33 is the 
same as the father’s main employer when the son was 15 to19 years of age. Rural subsample refers to those father-son observations 
with fathers having lived in rural areas, those with a second digit of the postal code equal to zero, and Urban subsample to those living 
in urban areas, with a second digit of the postal code not equal to zero. Boldface indicates results with t-statistics above 1.96, the 
analysis being based upon sample weights and robust calculations of standard errors. The specification for the last column is based 
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Table 8 
Alternative specifications of the linear regression to the mean model of intergenerational 
earnings transmission using information on the son ever being employed at the same 
employer as the father  
 











             
  ln father’s earnings      0.250  0.198  0.199  0.185 
               
  ln father’s earnings × Same Firm    0.113  0.105  0.105 
               
  Same Firm        -1.15  -1.09  -1.08 
  Same Industry          0.095  0.109 
  Same Region            -0.160 
               
  Constant      7.50  8.02  7.99  8.20 
               
Adjusted R
2      0.0485  0.0518  0.0553  0.0741 
             
 
Note: Table entries are least squares coefficients based upon the model described in the text. The dependent variable is the three year 
average of son’s log earnings. Father’s earnings are measured as a five-year average, and the father’s age and age squared are also 
included as regressors. All estimates are statistically significant with t-statistics of at least 8.72. 
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Table 9 
Alternative specifications of the linear regression to the mean model of intergenerational 
earnings transmission using information on the son having the same main employer as 
the father  
 











             
  ln father’s earnings      0.250  0.235  0.235  0.221 
               
  ln father’s earnings × Same Firm    0.177  0.178  0.174 
               
  Same Firm        -1.68  -1.73  -1.66 
  Same Industry          0.035  0.041 
  Same Region            -0.163 
               
  Constant      7.50  7.65  7.64  7.85 
               
Adjusted R
2      0.0485  0.0561  0.0572  0.0766 
             
 
Note: Table entries are least squares coefficients based upon the model described in the text. The dependent variable is the three year 
average of son’s log earnings. Father’s earnings are measured as a five-year average, and the father’s age and age squared are also 
included as regressors. All estimates are statistically significant with t-statistics of at least 4.39.  
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Figure 1 
Proportion of sons employed currently or at some point in the past with an employer their 
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  Son’s Age   
 
Note: Calculations are based on weighted observations of 71,215 sons who are all 33 years of age at the end of our observation period, 1996.  
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Figure 2 
Proportion of sons employed currently or at some point in the past with an employer their 
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  Father’s earnings percentile   
   
Note: Calculations are based on weighted observations of 71,215 sons who are 33 years of age. Father’s earnings percentiles are 
calculated using a five year average of earnings during the period sons were 15 to 19 years of age. On average fathers are 45.3 years 






Intergenerational earnings elasticities estimated using nearest neighbourhood estimation according to whether 33 year old sons ever 
had the same employer as their father or not 
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Figure 4 
Intergenerational earnings elasticities estimated using nearest neighbourhood estimation according to whether 33 year old sons had the 
same main employer as their father or not 
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